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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

regulations. 8 Following Frontiero v. Richardson- it appeared that
the Court was on the verge of recognizing sex based classifications
as being inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
In La Fleur, the Court failed to meet the real issue of sex discrimination head on. Whether or not La Fleur indicates a withdrawal
from Equal Protection as applied to sex discrimination is a question
40
yet to be answered.
RICHARD A. CLAPP

STATES-FEDERAL LAW AS SUPERSEDING STATE LEGISLATION-NORTH
DAKOTA GARNISHMENT AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT STATUTES ARE
PRE-EMPTED INSOFAR AS THEY FRUSTRATE THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT.

The United States Secretary of Labor alleged that two practices
employed in Grand Forks County in aid of execution and garnishment, pursuant to the North Dakota Century Code, violated provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA).11 The first
allowed a garnishee-employer to pay the entire wages of a debtoremployee to the clerk of court or sheriff pending a judicial determination; the second permitted the sheriff to levy judgment on
the debtor's earnings which were in payroll check form but undistributed by the debtors' employer. The United States District
Court, District of North Dakota, held these practices circumvented
the purposes of the CCPA. The Act therefore pre-empted the offending Code provisions 2 to the extent necessary to assure compliance. The Clerk of Court for the First Judicial District of North
38. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion would have applied an Equal Protection
analysis to the challenged rules. He did not reach the question whether strict judicial scrutiny should be applied. 94 S. Ct. at 802-04 (Powell, J., concurring).
The federal appellate decisions dealing with mandatory maternity leave rules were
all based upon an Equal Protection analysis. See Green v. Waterford Board of Education,
473 F.2d 629 (2nd Cir. 1973); Buckly v. Coyle Public School System, 476 F.2d 92 (10th
Cir. 1973); Schattman v. Texas Emplodyment Commission, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
39. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero a plurality of the Court found sex based classifications to be inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id.
40. For additional discussion of maternity leave see Comment, Mandatory Maternity
Leave of Absence Policies-An Equal Protection Analysis, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 240 (1972) ; See
also, Comment, Love's Labor Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV. CiV.
RIGHTs--CIv. LIB. L. Rxv. 260 (1972).
1. Consumer Credit Protection
discussion deals exclusively with
(1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1671-77 (1970)
2. N.D. CENT. ConE §§ 28-21-08,

Act, 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1970). This
Title III-Restriction on Garnishment, 82 Stat. 146, 162
hereinafter referred to as CCPA, or the Act.
32-09-17 (1960).
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Dakota and the Sheriff of Grand Forks County were permanently
enjoined from participating in any process which would deprive an
individual of the benefits and protection of the CCPA. Hodgson v.
Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1973).
The CCPA was enacted by Congress in 1968, after seven years
of hearings,8 to safeguard the consumer in the utilization of credit.'
Subchapter II of the Act, which went into effect on July 1, 1970,
places specific restrictions upon garnishment. It states:
[T]he maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings
of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 Per centum of his disposable earnings for that week,
or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that
week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly
wage prescribed by section 6(a) (1) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 in effect at the time earnings are
payable,
which ever is less.5
It further provides that, "[N]o court of the United States or any State
may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation of
this section. '8 Three exceptions 7 not pertinent to the issues of this
case, were provided and employers were forbidden from discharging
an employee because his wages had been subjected to garnishment
for one debt.8 The responsibility for enforcement was placed on
the Secretary of Labor. 9
This was remedial legislation intended to protect the wage earner
and assure his receiving a minimum amount of wages each payday
on which to live.10 Congressional investigation had disclosed that
unrestricted garnishment encouraged the predatory extension of credit and frequently culminated in the loss of employment or bank3.

2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1964 (1968).

4.
5.

Id. at 1962.
15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1970).

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

§ 1673(c).

The restrictions are not applicable to:
(1)
any order of any court for the support of any person.
(2) any order of any court of bankruptcy under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.
(3) any debt due for any State or Federal Tax.
§ 1673(b).

8.

Id.

§ 1674.

9. Id. § 1676. It was held In Oldham v. Oldham, 337 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972),
that no private civil remedy existed in view of the chapter's silence in this respect, while
the other two subchapters of the Act specifically provided for limited civil actions. Accord,
Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972).

10.
1973).

Reply brief for Plaintiff at 2, Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F.

Supp. 583

(D.N.D.
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ruptcy on the part of the debtor.11 The garnishment restrictions
in the Act are predicated on the power of Congress to regulate
commerce and establish uniform bankruptcy laws. 12 Their constitu-

tionality has been tested and upheld in Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court.1 8
The CCPA was not intended to establish sole federal control
over the field of garnishment law. The Act allows, and seems to
encourage, the states to retain control over this area by enacting
more limited garnishment laws or prohibiting it altogether."
In an effort to comply with the federal mandate, North Dakota's
garnishment laws were updated at the Forty-second Legislative Session.15 Previously, section 32-09-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code provided for a thirty-five dollar per week exemption from
garnishment of wages for a state resident who was the head of

a family. Its replacement mirrored the federal restrictions except
that "garnishment" was not defined and the minimum exemption
was increased from thirty to forty times the current minimum

wage. 6
In Hodgson v. Christopher1 the defendants admitted the alleged
practices were employed in Grand Forks County but maintained

they were contrary to neither the Century Code nor the CCPA. Defendants contended that garnishment and execution of judgment

are two separate and distinct procedures, with the aforementioned
CCPA and Code restrictions applicable only against garnishment.,8

They pointed out that executions are not specifically mentioned in
the statutory restrictions,"9

that garnishment and execution have

11. 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1970). Congressional hearings leading to the CCPA disclosed
that in Texas and Pennsylvania, which prohibit garnishment, the nonbusiness bankruptcies
numbered 5 and 9 per year respectively for every 100,000 in population, while in states havIng harsh garnishment laws the frequency jumped to 200 or 300 per 100,000. 2 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1978 (1968).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1970).
13. Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Ohio 1972). The court
found Congress had a rational basis for finding the legislation "necessary and proper" and
therefore the Act was constitutional In accordance with the test espoused In Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964). Accord, Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326
F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (1970). In addition, the Secretary of Labor may exempt any
state whose garnishment restrictions are substantially similar to those of the CCPA. Id. §
1675. "Substantially similar" has been interpreted to mean those statutes which provide
equal or greater protection for the debtor in every instance. 2 CCH LAB. L. REP. para. 30,
at 894 (1973).
15. The initial bill, closely resembling the federal statute, was introduced on January 22,
1971, by Representatives Myron Atkinson, Jr. and Edward Metzger. However, it was
amended in the Senate to Increase the exemption from 30 to 40 times the current minimum
wage and provide a two day notice requirement prior to the issuance of any garnishment
summons. Final passage came on March 29, 1971, and the provisions were codified in
North Dakota Century Code §§ 32-09-02 and 32-09-03.
16. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1978).
17. Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1973).
18. Id. at 585.
19. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970) ; N.D. CENT. CoD § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1973).
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traditionally different connotations, 20 and that each are dealt with
in completely different titles of the North Dakota Century Code.21
Defendants maintained that the 1971 amendment to Section 32-09-02
of the Code brought the state statutes into compliance with the
CCPA. They argued that Congress did not intend the restrictions
to apply in execution of judgment and therefore those provisions
in Chapter 28-21 of the Code were unaffected. 22
The court, by following such an interpretation, could have rendered the garnishment restrictions nearly a dead letter since
"[p]re-judgment wage attachments are . . . for all practical purposes 'constitutionally defunct' under Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corporation of Bayview, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) .,23 Instead it found
defendants' argument unpersuasive. The court noted that a review
of the Congressional findings and legislative history leading to passage of the CCPA, ' 4 "[c]learly demonstrates that Congress intended to maximize the protection available to the debtor. ' 25 Also lending support to a broader application are the Act's definition provisions, which state: "the term 'garnishment' means any legal or
equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual
are required to be withheld for payment of any debt. ' 26 The court
concluded that section 28-21-08 of the Code, although separate from
the garnishment statutes, was the type of procedure Congress was
seeking to remedy and was therefore preempted to the extent that
it frustrated the CCPA.27 This issue had previously been argued
in Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court8 with the court in that
instance reaching a similar conclusion. It held that whatever definition was given to "garnishment" for other purposes, the CCPA
clearly applies to proceedings in aid of execution as well as attachment.29
20. Brief for defendants at 3, lodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1973)
noted :
"Execution Is defined as putting the sentence of the law In force; the act of
carrying into effect the final judgment or decree of a court. And the issuance
of a writ of garnishment by a judgment creditor is not equivalent to an execution, so as to prevent the judgment being barred by limitations. Garnishment is in the nature of pleading and not a final process to enforce collection
of a judgment. Indeed, without a further judgment an [sic] execution in the
garnishment suit, it avails nothing in the collection of the original judgment.
Shields v. Stark, Texas 51, [sic] Southeastern 540." Words and Phrases, Vol.
15A, page 270.
21. Garnishment is covered under Chapter 9 of Title 32-Judicial Remedies, while execution of judgment is covered under Chapter 21 of Title 28-Judicial Probedure, Civil.
22. Brief for defendants at 2, Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.D. 1973).
23. Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125, 1140 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
24. See 2 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD.NEws 1962 (1968).
25. Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583, 586 (D.N.D. 1973).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c) (1970).
27. Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583, 586 (D.N.D. 1973). It is a well established
and fundamental doctrine that laws enacted by Congress, pursuant to power delegated
under the Constitution, are the Supreme Law of the Land and any state laws inconsistent
therewith are to that extent invalid. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819).
28. Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
29. Id. at 1139.
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Defendants further contended, in Hodgson v. Christopher, that
a debtor's wages once converted into paycheck form lost their identity
as "earnings" and became personal property subject to levy. The
court rejected this technical distinction and found that any difference, for purposes of the CCPA, was in form only. To have held
otherwise would have allowed sheriffs to completely avoid all garnishment restrictions by merely waiting until the employer typed
up the payroll checks or put the cash into pay envelopes before
making the levy.80 Such a holding would have been illogical and
clearly contrary to the broad definition given "earnings" in both
the Code and CCPA. 8 1
The final ambiguity in the North Dakota statutes which the
Secretary of Labor sought to clarify and correct concerned section
32-09-17.8 2 Under this section, an employer-garnishee could turn an
employee's entire wages over to the sheriff or clerk of court without
regard to any exemptions. Apparently not until after a court determination would the employee receive that portion of the wages
which were exempt under section 32-09-02 of the Code.88 This would
deprive the wage earner of his entire income for an indefinite period
just when he and his family probably needed it the most. The
court held this in effect frustrated the Congressional purpose and
therefore section 32-09-17 was pre-empted to the extent it allowed
excessive surrender of a debtor's wages. 4

The decision in the principle case is of fundamental importance
to every person who may come in contact with the garnishment

process. It means that each wage earner in North Dakota is automatically entitled to take home at least sixty-four dollars" every
week" regardless of any garnishment or execution of judgment
80.
31.
32.

Hodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583, 587 (D.N.D. 1973).
15 U.S.C. § 1672(a) (1970) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1973).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09-17 (1960). It provides:
In case the answer of the garnishee shall show Indebtedness to the defendant,
he may pay the amount thereof to the officer having a warrant of attachment in the action, if any, or otherwise to the clerk of the court, or, if the
garnishment is in aid of an execution, to the sheriff having the execution,
and the officer to whom such payment is made shall give him a receipt specifying the facts, and such receipt shall be a complete discharge of all liability
to any party for the amount so paid. If the answer discloses any money,
credits, or other property, real or personal, in the possession or under the
control of the garnishee, the officer having a writ of attachment or an execution, if any, may levy upon the interest of the defendant in the same; otherwise the garnishee shall hold the same until the order of the court thereon.
33. Iodgson v. Christopher, 365 F. Supp. 583, 584-85 (D.N.D. 1973).
34. Id. at 586.
85. 40 hours times $1.60 per hour, the current minimum wage, is $64. Under N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-09-02, this amount of a wage earner's weekly salary is not garnishable in any
amount. If, after legally required deductions, the wage earner has more than this amount
coming, it is garnishable at the rate of.25% or the amount it exceeds $64, whichever is less.
36. For pay periods other than a week the Secretary of Labor has prescribed a "multiple" which has an equivalent effect. 29 C.F.R. § 870.10 (1973). Since North Dakota has
adopted stricter restrictions, the figure 40 must be substituted for the 30 used in all federal
formulas.
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procedures pending against him. Coming in the wake of the Supreme
Court's newly established constitutional guarantees in garnishment
proceedings,3'7 the decision emphasizes the growing judicial concern

for the consumer and expands the protective blanket which has
been placed around him. Such a policy seems justified since garnish-

ment in recent years has become a sword of the creditor, used
against the poor and ignorant, rather than the shield it was intended

to be.88 In addition to saving many debtors from bankruptcy, 89
the recent statutory reforms and court decisions should force those
who rely on the remedy to be more prudent in their extensions
of credit.40
STEVE SHERMOEN

37. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bayview, 395 U.S. 337 (1969); cf.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
38. Comment, Wage Garnishment in New Mexico--Existing Debtor Protections Under
Federal and State Law and Further Proposals, 1 N.M.L. REv. 388, 399 (1971).
39. See Shuchman & Jantscher, Effects of the Federal Minimum Exemption from Wage
Garnishment on Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rates, 77 Com. L.J. 360 (1972).
40. Comment, Wage Garnishment in New Mexico-Exitsting Debtor Protections Under
Federal and State Law and FurtherProposals, 1 N.M.L. Rwv. 388. 398-400 (1971).

